



FAFEN GENERAL ELECTION OBSERVATION 2018

Key Findings and Analysis



Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN)

FAFEN General Election Observation 2018

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FAFEN is supported by Trust for Democratic Education and Accountability (TDEA)



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FREE & FAIR ELECTION NETWORK - FAFEN

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS



| | |
|--------------|--|
| AAT | Allah-o-Akbar Tehreek |
| ANP | Awami National Party |
| ARO | Assistant Returning Officer |
| ASWJ | Ahle Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat |
| BAP | Balochistan Awami Party |
| BNP | Balochistan National Party |
| CC | Constituency Coordinator |
| CERS | Computerized Electoral Rolls System |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| DC | District Coordinator |
| DDC | District Development Committee |
| DEC | District Election Commissioner |
| DMO | District Monitoring Officer |
| DRO | District Returning Officer |
| DVEC | District Voter Education Committees |
| ECP | Election Commission of Pakistan |
| EDO | Election Day Observer |
| EIMS | Election Information Management System |
| FAFEN | Free and Fair Election Network |
| FATA | Federally Administered Tribal Areas |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| GDA | Grand Democratic Alliance |
| GE | General Election |
| GIS | Geographic Information System |
| ICT | Islamabad Capital Territory |
| JI | Jamaat-e-Islami |
| JUIF | Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (Fazl) |
| KP | Khyber Pakhtunkhwa |
| LEA | Law Enforcement Agencies |
| LG | Local Government |
| MMA | Muttahida Majalis-e-Amal |
| MML | Milli Muslim League |
| MQMP | Muttahida Qaumi Movement |
| MQM | Mohajar Qaumi Movement |
| MRV | Mobile Registration Van |
| NA | National Assembly |
| NAB | National Accountability Bureau |
| NADRA | National Database and Registration Authority |
| NIC | National Identity Card |
| NP | National Party |
| NRC | NADRA Registration Center |



| | |
|--------------|---|
| PA | Provincial Assembly |
| PEC | Provincial Election Commissioner |
| PkMAP | Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party |
| PMLF | Pakistan Muslim League (Functional) |
| PML | Pakistan Muslim League |
| PMLN | Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) |
| PPPP | Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians |
| PSP | Pak Sarzameen Party |
| PTI | Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf |
| PVT | Parallel Vote Tabulation |
| PWD | Persons with Disabilities |
| REC | Regional Election Commissioner |
| RO | Returning Officer |
| SMS | Short Message Service |
| TDEA | Trust for Democratic Education and Accountability |
| TLP | Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan |

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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY



Pakistan's 10th General Election were held on July 25, 2018, marking the completion of a decade of continuous democratic rule under civilian governments. While successive elections and peaceful transfers of power suggest that a degree of democratic consolidation has occurred since 2008, controversies generated during each election cycle have continued to deepen pre-existing political cleavages. The significance of non-partisan election observation, a powerful tool for improving the quality of elections and enhancing citizens' understanding and confidence in political and electoral processes, cannot be overstated in the context of Pakistan's contemporary fragmented politics and evolving but fragile democratic system.

Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), a nationwide coalition of 54 Pakistani civil society organizations (CSOs), has built a strong reputation over the last decade among the full range of electoral stakeholders, including the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), political parties and the media, as the country's first and only data-driven, credible and independent domestic election observation network. FAFEN has successfully observed three General Election (GE) held since 2008 as well as all by-elections and local government elections.


FAFEN's election observation methodologies follow ECP's Code of Conduct for Domestic Observers and the national election law along with international best practices for domestic election observers as articulated in the 2012 Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations. These codes guide FAFEN's election observation work, including its commitment to observe all phases of the election process.

The Observation Methodology has also taken into consideration Pakistan's international legal commitments relevant to both election administration and election observation that are based on the country's ratification in 2010 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and of the Convention against Corruption (CAC) in 2007. Other particularly relevant international legal obligations stem from Pakistan's ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1996 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2011.



1. Multi-Phased Election Observation Methodology

Building on the experience gained and lessons learnt from FAFEN's nationwide observation of two preceding general election, namely GE 2008 and GE 2013, FAFEN adopted a methodical, multi-phased approach for its observation of GE 2018. The phases of the observation exercise included:



The geographical scope of the observation exercise, beginning at the onset of the election year in January 2018, included 130 districts and 272 National Assembly (NA) constituencies across Pakistan. The observers for each observation phase received training on the new consolidated election law, the Elections Act, 2017, and the election rules derived from it, along with the ECP's Code of Conduct for Domestic Observers. The scope and focus of each observation phase are described below:

1.1 Pre-Election Long-Term Observation

Beginning in January 2018, the focus of FAFEN's pre-election long-term observation phase included the local political environment and implementation of election-related laws and rules. This phase involved 130 District Coordinators (DCs) deployed in each district, whose responsibilities included the observation of the following processes and events in their respective districts:

| | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| Observation Period | January to May 2018 |
| Observation Scope | 130 Districts |
| Type of Observers | District Coordinators |
| Total Observers | 130 |

Finalization of Electoral Rolls

Preparation of electoral rolls is the foremost responsibility of any election management body. According to projected estimates, approximately 20 million eligible voters may be missing on Pakistan's electoral rolls, two-thirds of whom are women, largely because these potential voters do not possess the National Identity Card (NIC) required for registering as voters. The Elections Act, 2017, which unified and reformed electoral legislation in Pakistan, includes provisions for affirmative action to bridge the gender gap on electoral rolls. In accordance with these provisions, the ECP ran a massive voter registration campaign ahead of GE 2018, registering almost 8.9 million voters during the six months before the closing of the registration process.

In January 2018, FAFEN DCs interviewed District Election Commissioners (DECs) to assess their understanding of the voter registration process as defined in the new election law. DCs also observed meetings of District Voter Education Committees (DVECs) set up by the ECP to supplement its voter registration efforts. In addition, each FAFEN DC conducted a day-long observation of NADRA Registration Centers (NRCs) in their respective districts to assess the capacity of registration centers to facilitate citizens' applications for NICs. The DCs also observed the display of electoral rolls at the ECP's Display Centers prior to their finalization for GE 2018.

Delimitation of Constituencies

The 6th Housing and Population Census, completed in 2017, prompted the need to redraw the boundaries of electoral constituencies. In the interest of time, the Parliament gave the ECP a one-time exception to carry out fresh delimitations on the basis of provisional census results in lieu of officially published results as required by the constitution. Complying with the provisions of the Elections Act, 2017, and the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2017, the ECP carried out fresh delimitation of electoral constituencies for national and provincial assemblies ahead of GE 2018. FAFEN interviewed district leaders of over 50 political parties and the voters filing appeals or objections on the preliminary proposals to gather their perceptions regarding the impartiality of the delimitation process and its adherence to delimitation principles as laid out in the law. FAFEN observers interviewed political party representatives in March 2018 following the publication of the Preliminary Report on Delimitation of Constituencies, and interviewed voters who had filed objections to the preliminary proposals during April 2018.

Political Environment

FAFEN's observation of the political environment included gathering the perceptions of political parties regarding the level playing field for electoral contestation, their understanding of the 'new' election law, observation of political gatherings, and incidents of political and electoral violence. Additionally, FAFEN DCs observed local political alliances, party-switching by political leaders, and changing affiliations of ethnic, tribal and professional groups. FAFEN DCs identified up to five electorally relevant political parties or groups in their respective districts and held monthly interviews with their local leaders from January 2018 till May 2018. The observers also chronicled the incidents of political and electoral violence reported in the local press or observed directly.

Participation of Marginalized Groups

FAFEN conducted Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) to identify barriers to the electoral participation of marginalized groups, including women and religious minorities¹. FAFEN DCs conducted three FGDs in their respective districts during the month of February 2018, each with a group of women local government councilors, minority councilors and minority community members.

1.2 Pre-Election Medium-Term Observation

With the announcement of the Election Program in May 2018, FAFEN's pre-election observation expanded its focus from the district to the constituency level with the deployment of 264 trained Constituency Coordinators (CCs)². The CCs interviewed District Returning Officers (DROs), Returning Officers (ROs), election candidates, and citizens while also observing electoral processes and campaigns in 13,350 methodically sampled electoral areas [census blocks] across 270 constituencies (50 electoral areas in- each constituency) as election in two constituencies was postponed. This phase included observation of the following processes:

| | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Observation Period | June to July 2018 |
| Observation Scope | 272 NA Constituencies |
| Type of Observers | Constituency Coordinators |
| Total Observers | 264 |

¹ Detailed findings are compiled in a separate report.

² In districts with only one National Assembly constituency, the DCs performed the role of CCs.



Establishment of Polling Stations

The observation of polling stations aimed to assess the compliance of the process with the timeline provided in the Elections Act, 2017, and the election rules derived from the law. The assessment was made through observation of the Preliminary List of Polling Stations issued by ROs, hearings of objections on the preliminary list by DROs and voters' perceptions regarding the fairness of the selection of polling station sites. FAFEN CCs interviewed ROs and DROs and/or collected relevant information from their offices to assess adherence to the legally stipulated timeline for establishing polling stations. The CCs also interviewed up to five voters who objected to the Preliminary List of Polling Stations at each DRO's office. Additionally, CCs visited the proposed polling stations and documented the availability of basic amenities including boundary walls, clean drinking water, toilets, and ramps for wheelchair-bound voters.

Scrutiny Process of Nominated Candidates

FAFEN CCs observed the entire scrutiny process of nominated candidates conducted in the offices of ROs during the period specified for this purpose.

Candidates' Perceptions about Critical Election Processes

FAFEN CCs interviewed electoral candidates or their appointed election agents during the first week of the campaign period to assess their perceptions regarding the fairness of critical election processes, including voter registration, delimitation, establishment of polling stations, nomination and scrutiny processes, roles of election officials and caretaker governments, and level-playing field for electoral contestants.

Campaigning and Canvassing for Elections

In the sampled electoral areas, CCs monitored the implementation of the ECP's Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates and documented the presence of campaign materials that defied the code. They also interviewed three citizens including one woman in each sampled electoral area to gauge their experience and perceptions regarding elections.

Meetings with Election Officials






CCs observed ECP's preparations for elections by interviewing DROs and ROs at the beginning of the medium-term observation phase in early June 2018 and during the final week of the election campaign period in July 2018. Additionally, CCs held meetings with ECP-appointed DMOs during the final week of the campaign period.

1.3 Election Day Observation

For Election Day, FAFEN trained 17,725 nonpartisan citizen Election Day Observers (EDOs) to observe polling day processes at around 60,000 polling stations nationwide, and subsequently deployed 16,429 observers on Election Day. In GE 2013, FAFEN deployed 40,742 observers, while 18,829 observers in GE 2008. The following table represents regional distribution of Election Day observers deployed for GE 2018:

| | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Observation Period | July 25, 2018 |
| Observation Scope | 270 NA Constituencies |
| Type of Observers | Election Day Observers and CCs |
| Total Observers | 16,429 EDOs and 264 CCs |



| | |
|---|--|
| Punjab  | KP including FATA  |
| 9,088 observers | 2,950 observers |
| Sindh  | Balochistan  |
| 3,568 observers | 646 observers |
| ICT  | Overall |
| 177 observers | 16,429 observers |

These citizen observers visited up to four polling stations each on Election Day to directly observe and report on the election environment inside and outside polling stations, instances of electoral and political violence, pre-voting preparations at polling stations, and voting and counting processes inside polling stations. Each observer spent nearly one hour at each polling station to observe polling processes. In addition, the CCs observed the process of preparing provisional and final results at each RO office.

1.4 Post-Election Observation

Candidates' Perceptions about the Quality of Election Day Processes

Following the announcement of provisional results, FAFEN interviewed candidates to document their perceptions regarding the polling day processes.

Meetings with Election Officials

Following the results' consolidation process, CCs reached out to election officials (DECs, DROs and ROs) to gauge their level of satisfaction with the Election Day processes.

Election Disputes Resolution Process

For the post-election phase, FAFEN has deployed 20 legal researchers (lawyers) to observe and report on the election disputes resolution process in 15 election tribunals formed by the ECP.

| | |
|---------------------------|---|
| Observation Period | August 2018 onwards |
| Observation Scope | 270 NA Constituencies and 15 Election Tribunals |
| Type of Observers | CCs and Legal Researchers |
| Total Observers | 264 CCs and 20 Legal Researchers |

2. Automated Solutions for Observation and Reporting

An innovative Election Information Management System (EIMS) was deployed in order to improve FAFEN's data management and to enhance public access to election-related information, including observation findings. As part of EIMS, FAFEN developed a robust android-based mobile application ('App') for observer reporting throughout the day. However, due to restrictions on the use of mobile phones inside polling stations, EDOs were able to report on this App only after the end of their day's observation.



In addition, FAFEN set up a call centre equipped with voice messaging and SMS capabilities. Trained representatives at this multi-purpose Call Centre in Islamabad interviewed contesting candidates or their election agents in all provinces and ICT to inquire about their perceptions regarding the overall fairness of the polling process on Election Day.

Call Centre representatives also gathered information from DCs and CCs observing the general electoral environment on Election Day. They also spoke with 10% of the 16,429 deployed observers to verify data received via the App.

3. Parallel Vote Tabulation

A Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) compares the observed vote count in a sample of polling stations with the compiled election result for that constituency in order to provide evidence that confirms or disputes the official election result. PVT methodology was developed over 20 years ago and has been applied in many countries around the world by international and domestic election monitoring organizations as a proven analytical method for verifying the accuracy of government vote counts. The PVT is based on direct observation of vote counting in a scientifically-verifiable, robust sample of the polling stations in each constituency.

Experience with past PVTs has shown that drawing a sample of 25-30 polling stations provides sufficient data, within a relatively small margin of sampling error, to assess the reasonableness of official election results. Adding additional polling stations to the sample, even when the number of total polling stations is large, would not improve the margins of sampling error dramatically.

Although the PVT cannot measure other election-related problems like vote buying, voter intimidation, ballot box stuffing, or the use of ghost polling stations, PVTs are designed to identify potential inaccuracies in the official count by comparing it with actual observed and verified vote counts at sampled polling stations. The PVT can help detect centralized changes in vote counts if the percentage vote in official count differs in a statistically significant way from the percentages calculated from the PVT sample. In cases in which Election Commission releases polling-station level election results, PVT counts for sampled polling stations and ECP polling station data can be compared directly. The Judicial Commission formed to investigate rigging in the GE 2013 relied on FAFEN's PVT analysis in its report.

4. Quality Assessment of Election Results

FAFEN analyzed and assessed election results by utilizing official ECP documents in order to objectively measure the quality of election results. The assessment involved scrutiny of compliance of the results management process with election laws and rules, and document materiality of irregularities and illegalities, if any, on the overall election result. The assessment used the following election forms:

- Form-28 (List of Polling Stations for a Constituency)
- Form-33 (List of Contesting Candidates)
- Election Vote Count and Result Forms
 - Form-45 (Result of the Count)
 - Form-46 (Ballot Paper Account)
 - Form-47 (Provisional Consolidated Statement of Results of the Count)
 - Form-48 (Consolidated Statement of the Results of the Count Furnished by the Presiding Officers)

- o Form-49 (Final Consolidated Result)

The assessment broadly covered the following tests:

| | | |
|--|---|--|
| <p>1. Availability of relevant forms: whether or not the relevant forms are publicly available</p> | <p>2. Authenticity of relevant forms: whether or not the relevant forms bear authorized seals and signatures</p> | <p>3. Completeness of relevant forms: whether or not the relevant forms are duly filled</p> |
| <p>4. Correctness of relevant forms: whether or not the relevant forms are correctly filled i.e. calculations, etc.</p> | | <p>5. Consistency of relevant forms: whether or not the relevant forms contain consistent information</p> |

Additionally, the assessment methodology included comparing the information available on the ECP website with FAFEN's election observation findings. The findings of the assessment were used to measure and aggregate the scale of illegalities and irregularities at the polling station and constituency levels. The aggregated illegalities and irregularities were compared with the margin of victory (MoV) to determine overall impact of these deviations on the election outcome.

5. Deviations and Limitations

FAFEN's observation methodology initially envisaged dividing EDOs into mobile and static categories with the former moving from one polling station to another throughout the day and the latter staying at a single polling station for the entire day. This, however, could not be implemented due to a provision in the Code of Conduct for Security Officials that allowed observers to stay in any polling station only for a "brief duration". This guideline compelled a last-minute change in FAFEN's observation methodology, shifting all static observers to mobile observers.

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, EDOs were trained to report their observation findings throughout the Election Day using FAFEN's election observation App. However, ECP restriction on carrying mobile phones inside polling stations restricted the use of this App to only reporting at the end of the day.



1. Significant Improvements Accompanied by Persisting Irregularities

The enactment of the Elections Act, 2017 in October 2017 provided fresh impetus to the ECP for improving the enforcement of legal and regulatory provisions in GE 2018. As a result, a significant reduction in the prevalence of procedural irregularities was observed between GE 2013 and GE 2018. At least one irregularity was reported from every observed polling station in GE 2013, while at least one irregularity was reported from almost every fourth polling station in GE 2018. In other words, the proportion of observed polling stations where at least one violation of election laws, rules or codes of conduct was reported decreased from 100% to 38% between the two general elections.

However, significant improvements in some respects were accompanied by the persistence of weak enforcement of election laws and regulations in others, even registering deterioration in certain cases. As shown in Table 1.1 a significant decline was registered in the frequency of certain irregularities, such as the presence of campaign material inside polling stations, voters being permitted to vote without producing NICs, disregard of voter secrecy, incidences of violence and polling station capture, among others.

TABLE 1.1 Comparative List of Observed Irregularities Registering Decline between GE 2013 and GE 2018

| Electoral Irregularity | Percentage of observed PSs where irregularity occurred in GE 2013 | Percentage of observed PSs where irregularity occurred in GE 2018 |
|---|---|---|
| Campaign materials (posters, banners, flags etc.) were seen inside Polling Stations | 3.2% | 1.8% |
| Voters with an identification document other than NIC were permitted to vote | 9.3% | 1.1% |
| Voters without any identification were permitted to vote | 2.7% | 0.5% |
| Polling staff/polling agents/security personnel or other persons accompanied voters behind secrecy screens | 17.0% | 6.8% |
| Polling staff disallowed voters with disabilities from seeking assistance of their choice to cast vote | 14.9% | 3.5% |
| Polling Station was captured | 1.2% | 0.0% |
| Unauthorized persons pressured polling staff | 3.8% | 0.5% |
| Polling staff tried to influence voters' electoral choices | 2.0% | 0.5% |
| Voters already queued at polling stations were not allowed to vote at close of voting | 23.2% | 7.5% |
| Polling station result (Form-XIV/Form-45) was not provided to candidates/agents present at the polling stations | 7.5% | 2.5% |
| Incidence of violence was reported at polling station | 7.6% | 1.1% |



On the other hand, as shown in Table 1.2, a significant increase in irregularities of certain laws, rules and procedures was observed between the two elections. These irregularities were mostly concerned with polling station arrangements, availability of electoral rolls, calling out and striking off voters' names during the voter identification process, filling in counterfoils, issuance of ballot papers, and announcement of polling station results.

TABLE 1.2

Comparative List of Observed Irregularities Registering Increase between GE 2013 and GE 2018

| Electoral Irregularities | Percentage of observed PS where irregularity occurred in GE 2013 | Percentage of observed PS where irregularity occurred in GE 2018 |
|---|--|--|
| Guiding signs were not prominently displayed outside polling stations | 3.3% | 27.2% |
| Electoral rolls were missing at polling booths | 0.5% | 4.3% |
| Polling staff did not obtain polling agents' statements after showing them empty ballot boxes | 4.8% | 15.9% |
| Polling Officer did not call out the name of each voter loudly | 18.7% | 38.0% |
| Polling Officer did not strike off voters' name on electoral rolls | 1.6% | 5.8% |
| Polling Officer did not check indelible marks on voters' hands | 2.2% | 6.2% |
| APOs did not obtain voters' thumbprints on counterfoils | 1.8% | 5.3% |
| APOs did not write voters' NIC numbers on counterfoils | 1.1% | 5.2% |
| APOs did not stamp and sign on counterfoils | 1.8% | 5.0% |
| APOs did not stamp and sign on the backs of ballot papers | 0.8% | 4.4% |
| Polling officials marked ballot papers on behalf of voters | 0.8% | 1.2% |
| Polling agents/candidates marked ballot papers on behalf of voters | 1.0% | 1.5% |
| Government officials tried to influence voters to favour certain candidate/party | 0.6% | 0.7% |
| Polling station result (Form-XIV/Form-45) was not displayed outside the polling station | 15.3% | 18.8% |

1.1 Unclear Relationship of Irregularities with Electoral Advantage

A comparison of the number of electoral irregularities with the political affiliations of returned candidates in NA constituencies suggests that the incidence of irregularities may not be politically motivated, as almost all major parties were victorious in constituencies with larger numbers of observed irregularities. Constituencies are classified in the following three categories with respect to the numbers of irregularities observed in each constituency:

Constituencies with Low Incidence of Irregularities:

This category includes 180 NA constituencies – 112 in Punjab, 44 in Sindh, 18 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and six in Balochistan – where less than 10 legal, regulatory or procedural irregularities on an average per polling station were observed.

Constituencies with Moderate Incidence of Irregularities:

This category includes 82 NA constituencies – 29 in KP, 26 in Punjab, 15 in Sindh, nine in Balochistan, and three in ICT – where 10 to 15 legal, regulatory or procedural irregularities on an average per polling station were observed.

Constituencies with High Incidence of Irregularities:

This category includes six NA constituencies – three in KP, two in Sindh and one in Balochistan – where more than 15 legal, regulatory or procedural electoral irregularities on an average per polling station were observed.

In Punjab, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) were victorious in equal numbers of NA constituencies with low and moderate incidence of irregularities. Each of the two parties was the victor in 12 NA constituencies with moderate incidence of irregularities and 48 NA constituencies with low incidence of irregularities. Similarly, Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) was victorious in 36 NA constituencies in Sindh – 28 with low and eight with moderate incidence of irregularities. Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan (MMAP) won 10 NA constituencies in KP and Balochistan – six with moderate and four with low incidence of irregularities. The ruling party in Balochistan, Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), won four NA seats from the province – two with low and two with moderate incidence of irregularities. Moreover, PTI won four of six constituencies with high incidence of irregularities in KP and Sindh while independent, and MMAP candidates were victorious in the remaining two constituencies in this category. These patterns largely correlate with the parties' overall electoral strengths in respective provinces.

Tables 1.3 – 1.5 show regional distributions of constituencies in each category with regard to the party affiliations of returned candidates.

TABLE 1.3 Regional Distribution of Winning Parties in Constituencies with Low Incidence of Irregularities

| Party Affiliations of Returned Candidates | Balochistan | KP (including FATA) | Punjab | Sindh | Overall |
|---|-------------|---------------------|------------|-----------|------------|
| PTI | 1 | 9 | 48 | 8 | 66 |
| PML-N | | 2 | 48 | | 50 |
| PPPP | | 1 | 5 | 28 | 34 |
| Independent | | 2 | 6 | 2 | 10 |
| MQMP | | | | 6 | 6 |
| PML | | | 4 | | 4 |
| MMAP | | 4 | | | 4 |
| BNP | 2 | | | | 2 |
| BAP | 2 | | | | 2 |
| AMLP | | | 1 | | 1 |
| JWP | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Overall | 6 | 18 | 112 | 44 | 180 |



TABLE 1.4

Regional Distribution of Winning Parties in Constituencies with Moderate Incidence of Irregularities

| Party Affiliations of Returned Candidates | Balochistan | ICT | KP including FATA | Punjab | Sindh | Overall |
|---|-------------|----------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| PTI | 1 | 3 | 25 | 12 | 5 | 46 |
| PML-N | | | 1 | 12 | | 13 |
| PPPP | | | | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| MMAF | 4 | | 2 | | | 6 |
| BAP | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| GDA | | | | | 2 | 2 |
| Independent | 1 | | | 1 | | 2 |
| ANP | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| BNP | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| Overall | 9 | 3 | 29 | 26 | 15 | 82 |

TABLE 1.5


Regional Distribution of Winning Parties in Constituencies with High Incidence of Irregularities

| Party Affiliations of Returned Candidates | Balochistan | FATA | Sindh | Overall |
|---|-------------|----------|----------|----------|
| PTI | | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Independent | | 1 | | 1 |
| MMAF | 1 | | | 1 |
| Overall | 1 | 3 | 2 | 6 |

2. Statistically Improbable Voting Patterns

The vote-casting process involves several steps, starting with identifying a voter and ending with inserting the ballot paper into the ballot box. A conservative estimate of the time required to complete all these processes suggests that polling staff at one polling booth can accommodate a maximum of 45 voters in one hour. An hourly turnout of more than 45 voters at a polling booth is, therefore, considered to be statistically improbable. FAFEN's Election Day observation included noting the number of votes cast at polling booths at a given time. An analysis of this data enabled FAFEN to identify statistically improbable voting patterns at polling booths.


FIGURE 2.1: STATISTICALLY IMPROBABLE VOTING PATTERNS AT POLLING BOOTHS






As shown in Figure 2.2, statistically improbable voting patterns were identified at 5,921 polling booths in 257 NA constituencies (four percent) of 137,399 polling booths observed across Pakistan – 78,249 in Punjab, 34,615 in Sindh, 19,899 in KP (including FATA), 2,723 in Balochistan and 1,913 in ICT.

The booths where statistically improbable patterns were noted included 3,488 booths (four percent of those observed) in 133 NA constituencies of Punjab, 1,442 (four percent) in 60 NA constituencies of Sindh, 863 (four percent) in 47 NA constituencies of KP, 65 (two percent) in 14 NA constituencies of Balochistan and 63 (three percent) in three NA constituencies of ICT (refer to Figure 2.2).



The booths with statistically improbable voting patterns included 1,857 out of 39,567 observed polling booths (five percent) in male polling stations, 1,203 out of 30,648 observed booths (four percent) in female polling stations, and 2,861 out of 67,184 observed booths (four percent) in combined polling stations, as shown in Figure 2.3.




As shown in Figure 2.4, disaggregation of the observation data with respect to constituencies reveals that improbable voting patterns were noted at more than 20 percent of the polling booths of one NA constituency in KP. Similarly, 10 to 20 percent of polling booths of 13 NA constituencies – six in Punjab, five in KP and one each in Sindh and Balochistan – exhibited improbable voting patterns. Five percent to 9.9% of the polling stations of 74 NA constituencies – 39 in Punjab, 18 in Sindh, 16 in KP and one in Balochistan – exhibited such patterns, whereas nearly one to five percent of the booths in 169 constituencies – 88 in Punjab, 41 in Sindh, 25 in KP and FATA and 12 in Balochistan – were in the improbable category.

Notably, no improbable voting patterns were identified at any of the polling booths of nine constituencies. Of the remaining six NA constituencies, polls were not held in two constituencies while information required for voting pattern analysis could not be received on polling day from four constituencies.



FIGURE 2.4: POLLING BOOTHS WITH IMPROBABLE VOTING PATTERNS, DISAGGREGATED BY NA CONSTITUENCIES



3. Illegalities and Irregularities Disaggregated by Region and Polling Stations

FAFEN observers noted electoral illegalities and irregularities at 21,766 (38 percent) of the 57,832 polling stations observed across the country on Election Day, whereas no illegality or irregularity was observed at the remaining 36,066 (62 percent) polling stations. The observed irregularities were unevenly spread across the 21,776 polling stations, with a small proportion of polling stations registering 100 or more irregularities and others registering less than 10 irregularities of election laws or rules. Nearly 29 percent of the observed polling stations registered 10 or fewer irregularities per polling station, three percent registered 11 to 20 irregularities per polling station, while less than one percent registered 91 to 100 and more than 100 irregularities per polling station.

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show regional and polling station-wise distribution of the number of irregularities observed per polling station.

TABLE 3.1

Regional Distribution of Numbers of Electoral Illegalities and Irregularities Observed Per PS

| Numbers of Irregularities | KP | ICT | Punjab | Sindh | Balochistan | Overall |
|---------------------------|--------------|------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
| Zero | 5,214 | 349 | 20,823 | 8,745 | 935 | 36,066 |
| Up to 10 | 2,450 | 262 | 10,274 | 3,174 | 495 | 16,655 |
| 11 to 20 | 335 | 19 | 1,139 | 251 | 57 | 1,801 |
| 21 to 30 | 114 | 2 | 364 | 148 | 41 | 669 |
| 31 to 40 | 92 | 2 | 294 | 158 | 16 | 562 |
| 41 to 50 | 93 | 4 | 253 | 135 | 13 | 498 |
| 51 to 60 | 76 | 12 | 197 | 143 | 17 | 445 |
| 61 to 70 | 108 | 9 | 296 | 144 | 11 | 568 |
| 71 to 80 | 86 | 12 | 196 | 124 | 10 | 428 |
| 81 to 90 | 27 | 2 | 49 | 11 | 0 | 89 |
| 91 to 100 | 4 | 1 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 19 |
| More than 100 | 1 | 1 | 28 | 2 | 0 | 32 |
| Overall | 8,600 | 675 | 33,926 | 13,036 | 1,595 | 57,832 |

TABLE 3.2

Electoral Illegalities and Irregularities Observed Per PS Disaggregated by Polling Station Type

| Category of Irregularities | Male | Female | Combined | Overall |
|----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Zero | 10,382 | 8,619 | 17,065 | 36,066 |
| Up to 10 | 4,748 | 4,251 | 7,656 | 16,655 |
| 11 to 20 | 548 | 473 | 780 | 1,801 |
| 21 to 30 | 184 | 153 | 332 | 669 |
| 31 to 40 | 152 | 150 | 260 | 562 |
| 41 to 50 | 139 | 137 | 222 | 498 |
| 51 to 60 | 125 | 110 | 210 | 445 |
| 61 to 70 | 169 | 152 | 247 | 568 |
| 71 to 80 | 114 | 109 | 205 | 428 |
| 81 to 90 | 31 | 20 | 38 | 89 |
| 91 to 100 | 6 | 2 | 11 | 19 |
| More than 100 | 10 | 6 | 16 | 32 |
| Overall | 16,608 | 14,182 | 27,042 | 57,832 |

4. Inconsistent Enforcement of Electoral Laws and Regulations

Most of the electoral illegalities and irregularities observed on Election Day were evenly spread across the four provinces and ICT. Nonetheless, close analysis of the incidence of irregularities across the five regions reveals uneven patterns of specific irregularities. For instance, incidences involving voting secrecy compromises due to CCTV cameras were observed more frequently at polling booths of Sindh and Balochistan than of other regions. Similarly, the number of observed instances of polling agents wearing party badges or election symbols inside polling booths was higher in KP and ICT than in the other regions. Moreover, unavailability of ramps for wheelchair-bound voters was more rampant in the four provinces than in ICT, where only four percent of the observed polling stations lacked ramps. The practice of issuing voter-chits in party camps outside polling stations was observed to be more common in ICT and Punjab than in Sindh, KP and Balochistan.

Generally, the observed irregularities were equally spread across male, female and combined polling stations. However, the incidence of specific irregularities concerning election observation, uninterrupted voting, and secrecy of the ballot was relatively higher at female polling stations than at male polling stations.

Restrictions on Election Observation:

FAFEN observers at female polling stations faced more restrictions than their counterparts at male polling stations. Observers were disallowed from entering nearly 2.7 percent (or 383) of 14,182 female polling stations and 2.2 percent (or 372) of 16,608 male polling stations. Moreover, observers who were allowed inside nearly one percent (or 150) of the female polling stations were denied the opportunity



to observe the voting process inside polling booths. Comparatively, observers were barred from observing polling booths at 0.8 percent (or 140) male polling stations.

Interruptions during Voting Process:

According to the law, the voting process must continue without any interruptions or breaks. However, FAFEN observers noted breaks in the voting process at nearly five percent of the observed polling stations, including five percent (or 635) of female and four percent (or 647) of male polling stations.

Secrecy of Voting:

The right to secret ballot in an election is an inviolable right of every voter. The protection of this right, an essential feature of polling station management, is ensured by placing voting screens in the polling booths where no person can accompany a voter, excepting voters with disabilities. Overall, unauthorized persons were observed accompanying voters behind voting screens at six percent (or 855) of female polling stations in comparison to five percent (or 791) of male polling stations.

5. Conduct of Security Officials

Unlike prior elections, the ECP introduced a specific Code of Conduct for Security Officials performing duties at polling stations in GE 2018. In preceding elections, security personnel were not specifically trained about their roles and responsibilities outside and inside polling stations. The enforcement of a clear code led to a visible improvement in the conduct of security officials, especially in comparison to their conduct during by-elections preceding GE 2018 when it had come under scrutiny by independent observers, media and polling officials.

Security personnel were observed to be present outside 87 percent of the observed polling stations and performing their duties of inspecting voters before allowing them to enter polling station premises at 82 percent of the polling stations. They also effectively enforced the ban on voters from carrying mobile phones inside polling stations; reports of violation of the ban were received from only 10 percent of the observed polling stations. Complying with the code, security personnel also cooperated with media persons and allowed them to carry their cameras inside polling stations in the majority of observed cases; reports of restrictions on media persons from carrying their equipment inside polling stations were received from only eight percent of the observed stations. However, enforcement of the code's provisions regarding checking identity cards and vote-chits remained weak across the country. Despite the code's clear instructions for security personnel to refrain from checking identity cards or voter-chits, as this was the duty of polling officers, security officials were seen checking NICs and demanding voter-chits from voters at 84 percent and 76 percent of the observed polling stations, respectively.

6. Facilitating Voters with Special Needs and Voters Belonging to Marginalized Groups

The Elections Act, 2017 as well as the election rules and codes of conduct emphasize the need for special measures to enable voters belonging to marginalized groups to exercise their right to choose representatives. Similarly, the law allows voters with special needs to seek assistance from a person of their choice in casting their votes. Moreover, the Code of Conduct for Security Officials for GE 2018 contained unambiguous directions to afford preferential treatment to persons with disabilities (PWDs), transgender persons, and women (especially pregnant women or those with infants).

FAFEN's observation suggests that polling staff largely complied with these legal provisions. Polling staff allowed elderly persons and PWDs to receive help from a person of their own choice at 97 percent of the observed polling stations. Moreover, ramps were built or arranged for wheelchair-bound voters at

around 64 percent of the observed polling station buildings, and security personnel were seen facilitating PWDs, transgender persons, and women at the majority of polling stations.

7. Meagre Presence of International Election Observers


While independent election observation is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan, GE 2018 was unique in that it was held under a law that recognizes, for the first time, the right of citizen groups to observe elections domestically. The ECP accredited local and international observers to observe the election process and to have access to polling stations, counting of votes and consolidation of results.

However, FAFEN observers noted meagre presence of international observers particularly European Union – Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM) at polling stations across the country. International observers were seen at only 15 out of the total 57,832 observed polling stations – 11 in Punjab, two in Sindh and one each in ICT and KP.

8. ‘Unrepresentativeness’ of First-Past-the-Post System

Election results in Pakistan are decided according to the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP). In FPTP, voters can choose only one candidate, and the candidate with the most votes wins the election. The votes cast for losing candidates and the votes of winning candidates in excess of those required for victory play no part in determining the election outcome in this voting system and are therefore not translated into representation.


Pakistani elections have witnessed a growing trend of votes for losing candidates, with the percentage of such votes in GE 2018 reaching an all-time high since GE 2002. Nearly 57 percent of polled votes (31.1 million) did not translate into any representation during GE 2018, which is considerably greater than the unrepresented votes in GE 2013. The proportion of votes that went to losing candidates declined slightly between GE 2002 and GE 2008 but has been on the rise since. Figure 8.1 shows the pattern of votes cast not translating into representation during the last four general elections.



Regionally, votes for losing candidates have been higher in Balochistan and KP than in other regions since GE 2008, while GE 2002 saw this issue mostly in Punjab and ICT. Figure 8.2 shows the regional distribution of votes not translating into representation.




FIGURE 8.2: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES NOT TRANSLATING INTO REPRESENTATION



In addition to votes for losing candidates, the 2018 winning candidates received 11.8 percent ‘unnecessary’ votes in excess of the number of votes required to win the election, therefore, having no impact on the election outcome. The number of excess votes significantly declined in GE 2018 as compared to GE 2013, which indicates increasingly close contests between losing and runner-up candidates and smaller margins of victory for winning candidates. Prior to GE 2018, the percentage of excess votes had been on the rise in the preceding three general elections, growing from 15.1 percent in GE 2002 to 20.4 percent in GE 2013. Figure 8.3 shows the pattern of excess votes cast during the last four general elections.

FIGURE 8.3: HISTORICAL TREND OF EXCESS (‘UNNECESSARY’) VOTES FOR WINNING CANDIDATES



The increased competitiveness of elections might have played a role in reducing the number of excess (or ‘unnecessary’) votes, and this competitiveness also contributed to the increase in votes for losing candidates. However, neither of these kinds of votes (excess/unnecessary and votes for losing candidates) translate into any political representation in legislatures for citizens.


In total, in GE 2018 more than two-thirds of all votes – 57 percent polled for losing candidates and 11.8 percent excess votes of winning candidates – were not contributing to any political representation. This situation warrants reforms in the voting system. A better alternative to minimize such votes is one of the variations of Proportional Representation (PR) system, which is the most used voting system in the world. In the PR system, seats are allocated to political parties according to the proportion of votes received by them. Therefore, votes are never unrepresented and every vote counts.

9. Voter Registration and Turnout

Nationally, 8.45 million additional voters cast ballots in GE 2018 than in the preceding elections, marking a growth of 18.3 percent in voter turnout between GE 2013 and GE 2018. This significant surge in the polled votes coincided with an unprecedented increase in voter registration between the two general elections – growing by 22.9 percent from 86.18 million in 2013 to 105.9 million in 2018.

A historical comparison between the growth rates of registered voters and of polled votes for NA constituencies suggests a positive relationship, with the registered voters and polled votes growing simultaneously. However, there is no clear link between their rates of growth. For example, the voting population grew by 12.4 percent (8.88 million) between 2002 and 2008, while polled votes increased by 18.9 percent during this period. Between 2008 and 2013, registered voters increased by 6.7 percent (5.39 million), while polled votes increased significantly by 29.7 percent. From 2013 to 2018, the number of registered voters increased by 22.9 percent, but actual voters increased only by 18.3 percent. This anomaly may be explained by the exponential increase in the number of registered voters in the five years between the 2013 and 2018 elections (19.77 million), which exceeded the increase registered in the ten years between the 2002 and 2013 elections (14.27 million). Figure 9.1 shows the comparative growth in registered voters and polled votes since GE 2002.

FIGURE 9.1: INCREASE IN REGISTERED VOTERS AND POLLED VOTES SINCE GE 2002



A regional analysis confirms the positive relationship between growth in registered voters and polled votes. The highest growth in registered voters since GE 2013 was recorded in Balochistan, which also witnessed the highest surge in polled votes. Similarly, the growth in polled votes was consistent with the growth in registered voters in KP including FATA, Punjab, ICT and Sindh. With slight variations, the growth trends in voters and votes from GE 2002 to GE 2008 and from GE 2008 to GE 2013 confirm that an increase in voter registration positively impacts voter turnout. Figure 9.2 shows the growth in registered voters and polled votes in each region of the country between last two general elections. Figure 9.3 shows the same changes between GE 2008 and GE 2013, and Figure 9.4 shows the same between GE 2002 and GE 2008.



FIGURE 9.2: CHANGE IN REGISTERED VOTERS AND POLLED VOTES BETWEEN GE 2013 AND GE 2018, PER REGION




FIGURE 9.3: CHANGE IN REGISTERED VOTERS AND POLLED VOTES BETWEEN GE 2008 AND GE 2013, PER REGION






FIGURE 9.4: CHANGE IN REGISTERED VOTERS AND POLLED VOTES BETWEEN GE 2002 AND GE 2008, PER REGION



10. Invalid Ballots and Margin of Victory (MoV)


Nearly three percent of all votes polled during GE 2018 were declared invalid and excluded from the count by election authorities. According to the Final Consolidated Result (Form-49) of 268 NA constituencies, 1,693,558 ballots were not included in the count as they did not fulfil the legal criteria for validity. In comparison to other regions, the proportion of invalid ballot papers was largest in Balochistan where nearly six percent of the polled votes were declared invalid. Similarly, four percent of the votes polled in Sindh, three percent each in Punjab and KP and one percent in ICT were declared invalid (refer to Figure 10.1).

FIGURE 10.1: REGIONAL COMPARISON OF PROPORTIONS OF INVALID BALLOT PAPERS



Nationwide, the number of ballots excluded from the count exceeded the margin of victory (MoV) in at least 145³ constituencies, including 45 NA constituencies and 100 constituencies of Provincial Assemblies (PAs). In comparison to other regions, the largest number of such constituencies were in Punjab, followed by Sindh. Figure 10.2 illustrates the regional distribution of these constituencies.

FIGURE 10.2: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF CONSTITUENCIES WHERE INVALID BALLOTS EXCEEDED MOV




The victors in these 145 constituencies largely represented major political parties, with the exception of 11 constituencies in which independent candidates emerged as the winners. PTI, which emerged as the majority party in the NA in GE 2018, won 53 (37 percent) of these seats and was followed by PML-N and PPP, which respectively won 37 (26 percent) and 17 (12 percent) of these seats. The other winning


³ Two NA and 45 PA constituencies are not included in this count as their Final Consolidated Result (Form-49) were not found on the ECP's official website.



parties included MMAP in 10 (seven percent) constituencies, BAP in seven (five percent), GDA in four (three percent), PML and ANP in two each (one percent), and PkMAP and JWP in one each (one percent), as shown in Figure 10.3.




An assessment of 75,191 polling stations' Results of the Count (Form-45) suggests that the number of ballot papers excluded from the count by Presiding Officers (PrOs) surpassed the MoV at each of 15,789 (21 percent) observed polling stations. Regional disaggregation reveals that the polling stations observed in Balochistan had a larger proportion (31 percent) of excluded ballots exceeding MoVs than any other region, as shown in Figure 10.4. Around 28 percent of polling stations in KP, 25 percent in Sindh, 17 percent in Punjab and 10 percent in ICT had a larger number of ballot papers excluded from the count than the MoV.



As was the case with the constituencies in which invalid votes exceeded MoVs, observed polling stations in which the number of excluded ballots was more than the MoV were spread amongst various political parties. PTI was the winning party in around 34 percent of these polling stations, followed by PML-N (22 percent), PPPP (17 percent), MMAP (five percent), GDA (three percent), MQMP (two percent), TLP (two percent), ANP (one percent), BAP (one percent) and PML (one percent), as shown in Figure 10.5. Independent candidates were the winners in almost 10 percent of these polling stations.




FIGURE 10.5: PROPORTIONS OF POLLING STATIONS PER WINNING PARTY, WHERE EXCLUDED BALLOTS EXCEEDS MOVS



11. Parallel Vote Tabulation

Based on the result tallies collected from sampled polling stations, FAFEN was able to perform Parallel Vote Tabulations (PVTs) in 217 NA constituencies. (The PVTs in the other 53 NA constituencies remained inconclusive due to insufficient data or close MoV.) FAFEN's PVT estimates were consistent with the official results announced by the ECP in 206 (95 percent) constituencies, i.e. the winner and runner-up in each constituency estimated from the results of sampled polling stations matched with official results. Of the remaining 11 NA constituencies, six PVT estimates were partially consistent with ECP results, as they had the same winning candidate but different runner-up candidates. The PVT estimates were inconsistent with ECP results in three constituencies, including two in KP and one in Punjab. In these three constituencies, both the winning and runner-up candidates differed between PVT estimates and official results (refer to Figure 11.1).

FIGURE 11.1: PARALLEL VOTE TABULATION ESTIMATES, PER REGION, CONSISTENT AND INCONSISTENT WITH OFFICIAL RESULTS




12. Mainstream Parties Dominate Majority of Polling Stations

The polling station result analysis depicts a tripartite dominance of the country's electoral landscape as the mainstream parties PTI, PML-N and PPPP were the winners in three-quarters (76 percent) of the polling stations for the NA election. Independent candidates led the vote count in nine percent of polling stations, and the remaining 15 percent went to an assortment of 47 parties, each of which won



at least one polling station. Figure 12.1 shows the distribution by winner political parties of 75,191 polling stations for which the Result of the Count (Form-45) were available on the ECP's website and legible.


FIGURE 12.1: PROPORTION OF POLLING STATIONS WON BY MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES



More than 50 percent of the votes for each of the three major parties (PTI, PMLN and PPPP) were cast at polling stations in which they emerged as winners. However, the other almost half of each party's vote bank was distributed among polling stations that they did not win, indicating close competition among the three parties at the polling station level. For example, nearly 53 percent of PTI's vote bank voted in polling stations where the party was victorious, but the remaining 47 percent of the party's vote bank was distributed among polling stations where it lost. Similarly, 54 percent and 55 percent of the respective vote banks of PMLN and PPPP cast ballots in the polling stations won by each party.

A glance at relatively smaller parties suggests that the major portion of their vote banks were scattered among polling stations that they lost in GE 2018. For instance, 83 percent of ANP's votes, 78 percent of PkMAP's votes and 74 percent of MMAP's votes were scattered in polling stations lost by each of them. The new entrant in the electoral race, Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), which managed to get more than two million votes during GE 2018, had 89 percent of its vote bank scattered among the polling stations that it lost. Figure 12.2 shows a distribution of the vote banks of 11 major parties and independent candidates with regard to the victory status at polling station level.

FIGURE 12.2: POLITICAL PARTY VOTE BANKS DISAGGREGATED BY POLLING STATIONS WHERE THEY WON AND LOST




13. Assessment of Election Result Forms

FAFEN conducted an assessment of election result forms (Form-45 and Form-46) prepared at polling stations and published by the ECP on its official website (www.ecp.gov.pk). The assessment covered Form-45 from 78,467 polling stations spread across 249 NA constituencies and Form-46 of 70,528 polling stations located in 234 NA constituencies. The assessors were able to match Form-45 and Form-46 of 52,228 polling stations spread across 164 NA constituencies.

Accuracy of Form-45:

The assessment of Form-45 reveals that more than a quarter of the forms (22,319 or 28 percent) were either inaccurate⁴, unduly filled⁵ or were only partially available⁶. The majority of such forms (17,722) were unduly filled. Figure 13.1 shows a regional distribution of these Form-45.



Missing Legal Formalities on Form-45:

According to Rule 81 of the Election Rules, 2017, the PrOs prepare the Result of the Count on Form-45. In addition to basic information about the constituency and the polling station to which it relates, Form-45 includes information about voters assigned to the polling station, the number of valid votes polled in favor of each candidate, ballots excluded from the count, gender-disaggregated turnout, and the credentials, signatures, and thumb impressions of PrOs and Most Senior Assistant President Officer (APO).

Assessment of these forms reveals that the National Identity Card (NIC) numbers of PrOs and APOs, required credentials on the form, were the most frequently omitted legal formalities. Nearly 14.7 percent of the forms lacked NIC numbers of PrOs, while 11.8 percent did not have NIC numbers of APOs. Other legalities missing in the forms included APOs' signatures in 5.4 percent, APOs' designations in 3.3 percent, APOs' thumb impressions in 2.7 percent, and names of Senior Most APOs in 2.3 percent of the forms. Similarly, 2.6 percent of forms lacked designations of PrOs, 2.2 percent lacked thumb impressions

⁴ Inaccurate filling of Form-45 means the forms had numerical or arithmetical errors.


⁵ Unduly filled Form-45 did not record the votes of one or more contesting candidates

⁶ Several Form-45 were either partially uploaded on the website, e.g. only one page of the two-page Form was uploaded or uploaded pages were torn/cut or were filled in illegibly.




of PrOs, two percent lacked the PrO's signature, and 1.9 percent were missing names of PrOs. Figure 13.2 shows the percentage of polling stations nationwide where Form-45 lacked various legal formalities.

FIGURE 13.2: MOST COMMON MISSING LEGAL FORMALITIES ON FORM-45




Regionally, the missing legal formalities were most common in Balochistan and Punjab as compared to other regions. Figure 13.3 shows the regional distribution of polling stations where Form-45 lacked relevant legal formalities.

FIGURE 13.3: MISSING LEGAL FORMALITIES ON FORM-45, DISAGGREGATED BY REGION




Missing Legal Formalities on Form-46:

Similar to Form-45, the most common missing legal formalities on Form-46 were NIC numbers of PrOs and Senior Most APOs. Figure 13.4 shows the percentage of polling stations nationwide where Form-46 lacked certain legal formalities.




Regional disaggregation of the missing legal formalities on Form-46 reveals that they were more commonly found in Balochistan, Sindh and KP than in other regions. Figure 13.5 shows the regional distribution of polling stations where Form-46 lacked relevant legal formalities.






Mismatched Signatures and Handwritings:

Of 52,228 polling stations where both Form-45 and Form-46 were available and could be matched, the signatures of authorized election staff on the two forms were incongruent or mismatched at nearly two percent of the polling stations, whereas the handwritings on both forms were dissimilar at nearly one percent of the polling stations. Regionally, mismatched signatures and handwriting on the result forms was more prevalent in polling stations of Punjab than in other regions. Figure 13.6 shows a regional distribution of polling stations with mismatched signatures and handwritings on Form-45 and Form-46.



14. Turnout Trends at Polling Stations:

Of 56,148 polling stations for which accurate copies of Form-45 were available, the results of the count of 30,975 (55 percent) polling stations showed moderate voter turnout ranging between 41 percent and 60 percent, whereas 15,497 (27.6 percent) polling stations recorded higher turnout between 61 percent and 80 percent, and 2,282 (four percent) recorded even higher turnout between 81 percent and 100 percent. As many as 6,512 (11.5 percent) polling stations had turnout ranging between 21 percent and 40 percent, 837 (one percent) had turnout ranging between one percent and 20 percent, while 45 (0.1 percent) recorded turnout less than one percent. Most of the polling stations (21) with extremely low turnout (below one percent) were located in KP, while most of the polling stations (1,136) with exceptionally high turnout (between 81 percent and 100 percent) were situated in Punjab. Further breakdown of polling stations with regard to their turnout is shown in Figure 14.1.






15. Distribution of Last Digits of Polling Station Result Counts

“Last digit” refers to the last digit of the vote count at a polling station. For instance, if 786 votes were polled at a polling station, the last digit of the count is six. According to Beber and Scacco (2012), the last digit may be helpful in identifying irregular result counts.⁷ If vote counts are produced in an unproblematic election, then the distribution of the last digits should be uniform, which is to say that each of the ten digits (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) should occur with a frequency of 1/10 (one in ten). In this scenario, the mean of last digits of vote counts (“LastC”) should be 4.5. Therefore, the value of LastC expected in the absence of fraud or strategic (manipulative) electoral behavior should not depart much from 4.5.

FAFEN applied the Last Digit Mean test on polling station result counts of 249 NA constituencies. A quarter of these constituencies (63) had a last digit mean of 4.5, indicating trouble-free results in these constituencies. However, around 38 percent of constituencies (95) had a mean differing 0.1 from the perfect LastC score of 4.5. In addition, four percent of constituencies got a mean differing 0.5 or more from 4.5, which suggests a problematic statistical deviation in the polling station result counts of these constituencies. Figure 15.1 presents the distribution of this LastC analysis.



In simple terms, the further the mean from 4.5, the higher the possibility of external influence on the election result. Disaggregating the LastC of 249 constituencies with regard to winning political parties shows that PTI won 25 of 45 constituencies which had a LastC farther than 0.3 from 4.5. Similarly, PPPP won seven, MMAP five, PML-N four, and independents and MQMP two each of the remaining constituencies. PTI was the winning party in two of four constituencies which had most distant LastC from 4.5 (3.9 and 5.1). Table 15.1 shows the NA constituencies with LastC deviating significantly from 4.5, disaggregated by winning parties.

TABLE 15.1 NA constituencies with LastC deviating significantly from 4.5, disaggregated by winning parties

| Parties | Mean of Last Digits of Polling Stations' Result Count (LastC) | | | | | | | | Overall |
|----------------|---|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| | 3.9 | 4 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 5 | 5.1 | |
| PTI | 1 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 9 | 2 | | 1 | 25 |
| PPPP | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | 2 | | | 7 |
| MMAP | | | 2 | 2 | 1 | | | | 5 |
| PML-N | | 1 | | 2 | | | 1 | | 4 |
| IND | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | 2 |
| MQMP | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 2 |
| Overall | 2 | 6 | 7 | 12 | 11 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 45 |

⁷ For more details on Last Digit Mean Test, refer to https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00MXR7.pdf




Moreover, the constituencies with significantly deviating LastC were spread across all five regions. As many as 17 of these were in KP, 13 in Punjab, 10 in Sindh, four in Balochistan and one in ICT (refer to Table 15.2).

TABLE 15.2 NA constituencies with LastC deviating significantly from 4.5, disaggregated by political party

| Region | Mean of Last Digits of Polling Stations' Result Count | | | | | | | | Overall |
|----------------|---|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| | 3.9 | 4 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 5 | 5.1 | |
| Balochistan | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | | | | 4 |
| KP incl. FATA | 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 5 | | | 1 | 17 |
| ICT | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Punjab | | 2 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | | 13 |
| Sindh | | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | | 1 | 10 |
| Overall | 2 | 6 | 7 | 12 | 11 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 45 |


16. Over-Crowded Polling Stations

The Elections Act, 2017 prescribes a limit of 1,200 voters to be assigned to each polling station and 300 voters to each polling booth. The law allows for deviations, if necessary, provided that the election authorities record the reasons in writing. The spirit of the law is to minimize the burden on each polling station (or, in other words, to optimize the distribution of the burden among all polling stations) in order to facilitate smooth and uninterrupted voting process. However, an examination of the Lists of Polling Stations reveals that more than half (50.59 percent) of the polling stations set up on polling day were assigned more than 1,200 voters each. The proportion of polling stations assigned more than the advised limit of voters was highest in the most populous province of Punjab, where around 54.44 percent polling stations were assigned more than 1,200 voters. The least populous regions of the country, ICT and Balochistan, had relatively smaller proportions of polling stations with more than 1,200 assigned voters. Figure 16.1 shows the regional distribution of polling stations with regard to the number of voters assigned to them.



17. Variation between Turnout of NA and PA Constituencies

The turnout for NA and PA constituencies varied slightly compared to each other within provinces, but no significant variations were observed. The overall turnout for NA constituencies (excluding constituencies in FATA and ICT) was 52.07 percent, while the overall turnout for all 570 PA constituencies was recorded at 51.98 percent. The turnout in NA and PA constituencies of KP were 45.7 percent and 44.52 percent, respectively. The respective turnouts for NA and PA constituencies were 56.4 percent and 55.94 percent in Punjab, 46.63 percent and 47.13 percent in Sindh, and 44.19 percent and 45.14 percent in Balochistan. Figure 17.1 shows a regional distribution of NA and PA turnouts.





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